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[T]he most honest judges are after all only honest men, and when set to determine 
matters of policy and statesmanship will necessarily be swayed by political feeling and 
by reasons of state. But the moment that this bias becomes obvious a Court loses its 
moral authority, and decisions which might be justified on grounds of policy excite 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
 Professor of Law, Lancaster University Law School, UK. I am grateful to the 
participants in the Brexit: Origins and Prospects Symposium for their comments, and in 
particular to Professor Weiler for the graciousness of his critique of a position at such 
variance to his own. I am also grateful to Mark Conway, Richard Cullen, Barbara Mauthe, 
Chris McNall, James Summers and Tom Webb for comments given separately. 
Since 14-15 April when the Symposium was held, events have, of course, moved on, 
indeed, incredibly so. But I have not attempted to take such events into account, save in a 
few, specially indicated footnotes when not doing so seemed outright absurd.  
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natural indignation and suspicion when they are seen to be not fully justified on 
grounds of law. 
Dicey, The Law of the Constitution, 18851 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 Though the implementation of the United Kingdom’s (UK) decision to leave the 
European Union (EU) of course involves enormous difficulties, in the period immediately 
after the decision was taken the unwritten British constitution appeared to have handled the 
specifically political difficulties with some facility. The exception to this is one that proves 
the rule, for that exception is the Scottish National Party’s policy of using the decision to 
leave to further its argument for Scottish independence, and this is a policy which seeks to 
break with that constitution. By far the principal obstacle to the implementation of the 
decision to leave has been, not directly political, but legal, for judicial review was obtained of 
the way the UK Government proposed to carry out that implementation. The UK Supreme 
Court’s (UKSC) decision in R. (Miller and another) v The Secretary of State for Exiting the 
European Union,2 popularly known as “the Brexit case” but which, together with the 
judgment from which this was an appeal, shall here be referred to as Miller, was handed 
down on 24 January 2017. If this case was brought with the political purpose of ultimately 
preventing Brexit, then it has been a complete failure, for it was immediately clear that the 
UKSC judgment  would not serve this purpose, and indeed the UK gave notice to the 
President of the European Council of its intention to leave the EU on 29 March 2017,3 
entirely in line with the timetable for the implementation of the referendum result which the 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
1 A.V. DICEY, The Law of the Constitution, in 1 THE OXFORD EDITION OF DICEY 92-93 
(2013). 
2 [2017] UKSC 5; [2017] 2 W.L.R. 583, 621; [2017] 1 All E.R. 593. Hereinafter 
references to this judgment will be given as, e.g., (S.C. [28]), i.e. para. 28 of the UKSC 
judgment.  
3 H.C. Deb. vol. 624 col. 251 (March 29, 2017) (Mrs. Theresa May, Prime Minister).  
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Prime Minister announced at the Conservative Party Conference held some seven months 
after that result was known but before Miller had been heard.4 
 Nevertheless, Miller was unprecedented and represents a constitutional coup in which 
the UKSC has created itself as a constitutional court.5 That the case was heard at all, the way 
it was heard, and the UKSC’s decision to instruct the UK Government, and therefore the UK 
Parliament, to pass an Act of primary legislation overturns sovereignty of Parliament and 
establishes judicial supremacy in the UK. This is the culmination of a process which 
hindsight makes clear has inexorably been gathering pace since the passage of the Human 
Rights Act 1998.6 One reason that that process has been able to gather pace is that there are, 
of course, good reasons for the creation of a constitutional court, reasons which certainly 
have resonance amongst the overlapping UK legal and political elites which have supported 
and in many cases still support continued membership of the EU. But, as if to give a profound 
example of why the mode of rule of these elites received such a rebuff from the electorate’s 
decision to leave, the major constitutional change involved in creating such a court has not 
been a matter of democratic persuasion7 but has indefensibly been done in a “legal” way 
which is tantamount to incomprehensible to almost every citizen of the UK, as the 
dispiritingly uncomprehending public debate about Miller more than sufficiently 
demonstrates. Though Brexit will now proceed to the point where the UK leaves the EU on 
29 March 2019, the restoration of the sovereignty of Parliament which was the main impulse 
behind the referendum decision will be frustrated, not in a political, but in a legal way which 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
4 Josh May, Read in Full: Theresa May’s Conservative Party Speech on Brexit, 
POLITICSHOME, OCTOBER 2, 2016, HTTPS://WWW.POLITICSHOME.COM/NEWS/UK/POLITICAL-
PARTIES/CONSERVATIVE-PARTY/NEWS/79517/READ-FULL-THERESA-MAYS-CONSERVATIVE. 
5 See the Addendum to this article. 
6 (c. 42) (U.K.). Though the issue is legally separate from leaving the EU, Miller now 
makes it clear that the effective reversal of this process requires the repeal of this Act and 
concomitant withdrawal from the European Convention on Human Rights. 
7 JEFFREY GOLDSWORTHY, THE SOVEREIGNTY OF PARLIAMENT 279 (1999). 
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has so avoided public debate as to be almost surreptitious. In Miller, the UK has had its 
Marbury v Madison.8 
 The point which I wish to make is not, however, about the formal legal, if I may put it 
this way, constitutional position of judicial supremacy created by Miller, but rather is about 
the civil procedural arrangements which were made to allow Miller to be heard and so create 
that position. It is, however, obviously necessary to describe at least the main legal points in 
order to proceed at all, and, disavowing any intention to explore the arguments in Miller more 
than is necessary for this limited purpose, I will now do so. 
  
I. MILLER AND THE SOVEREIGNTY OF PARLIAMENT 
On 23 June 2016, a majority of the citizens of the UK who participated in a referendum 
which asked the question “Should the United Kingdom remain a member of the European 
Union or leave the European Union?”9 voted to leave.10 The procedure for a Member State to 
withdraw from the EU is governed by Art. 50 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU),11 and 
in public debate over Brexit the UK’s giving notice under this procedure has become widely 
known as “triggering” Art. 50. On 29 July 2016, Mrs. Gina Miller, a UK citizen, served claim 
to bring judicial review proceedings against the newly created Secretary of State for Exiting 
the European Union (SSEEU) which were intended to “clarify the procedural steps necessary 
for the UK to trigger Article 50 in line with the UK constitution,” and to this was joined a 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
8 5 U.S. 137 (1803). 
9 U.K. GOVERNMENT, E.U. REFERENDUM, https://www.gov.uk/government/topical-
events/eu-referendum/about. 
10 On a turnout of 72.2% (33,551,983 valid votes returned from a total electorate of 
46,500,001), 51.9% (17,410,742) voted to leave and 48.1% (16,141,241) voted to remain: 




11 O.J. 2012/C. 326/1. 
 5 
 
claim to similar effect previously served by Mr. Deir Tozetti Dos Santos, also a UK citizen.12 
The proceedings were heard before what I shall pro tem call the High Court on 13, 17 and 18 
October 2016, which handed down its single judgment ruling against the SSEEU on 3 
November 2016.13 An appeal by the SSEEU to the UKSC was heard on 5, 6, 7 and 8 
December 2016 and a judgment, dismissing the appeal, was handed down on 24 January 
2017. A single majority judgment stated the views of eight of the eleven Justices who heard 
the appeal, including the President of the UKSC, Lord Neuberger, and the Deputy President, 
Lady Hale (S.C. [1]-[152]). There were three dissenting judgments, by Lord Reed JSC (S.C. 
[153]-[242]), Lord Carnwath JSC, agreeing with Lord Reed and making some additional 
arguments (S.C. [243]-[274]), and Lord Hughes JSC (S.C. [275]-[283]). 
 Adamantly maintaining that the political merits of the decision to leave were irrelevant, 
the High Court insisted that “[t]he legal question is whether the executive government can 
use the Crown’s prerogative powers to give notice of withdrawal” (H.C. [5]), and, equally 
insistently disavowing a political intent (S.C. [3]), the UKSC saw the “main issue” in the 
same way (S.C. [5]). This was a peculiarly English way of addressing things which calls for 
some explanation. The British constitution carries many marks of England’s long 
constitutional history, some of which are still of great legal and political significance. Perhaps 
now the most significant is that the Government’s power to conduct foreign policy is 
fundamentally derived from the Royal prerogative of English Monarchs in the days of their 
political sovereignty. The continuance of the prerogative in any area of domestic or foreign 
policy has, of course, long been entirely subject to Parliamentary sufferance, and the precise 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
12 Mishcon de Raya LLP, Article 50 Q and As, https://www.mishcon.com/qanda. 
Mishcon de Raya are the firm of solicitors which advised the applicants. 
13 R. (Miller and another) v The Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union 
[2016] EWHC 2768 (Admin); [2017] 2 W.L.R. 583; [2017] 1 All E.R. 158; [2017] 1 
C.M.L.R. 34; [2016] H.R.L.R. 23; [2016] A.C.D. 134. Hereinafter references to this 
judgment will be given as, e.g., (H.C. [28]), i.e. para. 28 of the High Court judgment. 
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extent of the foreign policy prerogative is now much shaped by constitutional convention and 
statute; indeed a statute purporting to enlarge the role Parliament previously enjoyed under 
constitutional convention in the ratification of treaties has but recently been passed.14 The 
fundamental power of the UK Government to conduct foreign policy nevertheless remains a 
matter of prerogative, and it was as an exercise of this prerogative that the UK Government 
proposed to give notice under Art. 50 TEU. 
 Despite the extent of the discussion of prerogative powers in both judgments passim, it 
does not sufficiently emerge anywhere save from the dissent of Lord Reed how much of a red 
herring these powers were. That the UK Government’s power to conduct foreign policy is 
indeed derived from ancient Royal prerogative is just a matter of constitutional history. Every 
state has similar executive powers, though they are, of course, elsewhere almost always 
derived from a relatively recently written constitution. And, to focus just on the making or 
unmaking of treaty or other international commitments, the reason for this is that it is neither 
desirable nor even possible that the legislature should be intimately involved in the discussion 
of prospective changes to those commitments. As Lord Reed pointed out, this compelling 
reasoning may be found in Blackstone, and it applies just as much in the twenty first century 
as in the eighteenth, and just as must to all modern states as to the UK: 
The compelling practical reasons for recognising this prerogative power to manage 
international relations were identified by Blackstone: “This is wisely placed in a single 
hand by the British constitution, for the sake of unanimity, strength, and despatch. Were 
it placed in many hands, it would be subject to many wills, if disunited and drawing 
different ways, create weakness in a government; and to unite those several wills, and 
reduce them to one, is a work of more time and delay than the exigencies of state will 
afford” (S.C. [160]).15 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
14 Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010 Pt. 2 (c. 25) (U.K.). This provision 
was briefly discussed by the High Court (H.C. [13]) and the majority in the UKSC (S.C. 
[58]), and more substantially by Lord Reed, dissenting (S.C. [161]-[163], [211]). Lord 
Carnwath, dissenting, also briefly discussed it (S.C. [249]).  
15 Quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *250. Dicey radically restated 
this for Parliamentary rule. DICEY, supra note 1, 12-13. 
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 Whilst rendering the executive properly accountable to the legislature might even be 
described as the intractable main issue of constitutional law, and whilst Miller touches on an 
area in which some policy having to be conducted in secrecy creates particular problems, 
there is nothing specific to the prerogative foreign policy powers that precludes Parliamentary 
scrutiny. Under the U.K.’s Westminster system, there is always the possibility at any time of 
Parliament calling the Government to account over any issue, including foreign policy, if 
there is the political will in Parliament to do so, recognising that, of course, the Government 
is the Government only because it normally can command a majority in the House of 
Commons. I shall later expand upon the relevance of this point in the context of Miller.16 
 Let us assume that a Government alters the UK’s international legal position by 
entering into or withdrawing from a treaty commitment. In many cases this will require a 
concomitant alteration in the UK’s domestic law.17 Under the UK’s still strongly dualist 
approach,18 this requires the UK Government to secure the passage of the necessary domestic 
legislation, without which the alteration has no domestic effect.19 Such is the degree of 
penetration into UK domestic law of EU law – this penetration of non-national law into the 
national legal systems of its Member States is what makes the EU historically unique20 - it 
was a fortiori the case that leaving the EU would require domestic legislation; to suppose 
otherwise is absurd. The UK Government has never denied this, and at the Conservative 
Party Conference following the referendum result the Prime Minister announced that 
implementation of the decision to leave would require a “Great Repeal Bill” to come into 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
16 See supra text accompanying notes 80-92. 
17 In Miller what would seem to have been a problematic authority for the applicant was 
distinguished precisely on the ground that ratifying a Protocol to the TEU from which the UK 
had opted out would not have had any domestic effect (S.C. [90]-91]). 
18 JAMES CRAWFORD, BROWNLIE’S PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 63 (8th 
ed. 2012). 
19 ANTHONY AUST, MODERN TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 167-73 (3d ed. 2013).  




force instantly the UK left.21 This was, as, in fairness, a closer reading of the Prime Minister’s 
speech than it generally has received would have shown the Government to have always 
realised,22 a misleading way to describe the legislation to be passed, for a vital purpose of that 
legislation will be initially to preserve in UK law the overwhelming proportion of EU law. 
This will be essential to avoid legal chaos, leaving aside the substantial desirability of much 
of this legislation, in the passage of which the UK played a full part. But nevertheless the 
centrepiece of the legislation23 will be the repeal of the European Communities Act 1972,24 
the domestic legislation by which Parliament subordinated the legal sovereignty of the UK to 
the law of what is now the EU. 
 At all times, then, giving Art. 50 notification was subject to the will of Parliament 
according to the previously settled UK constitutional position. This being so, a particular 
difficulty potentially arising from Miller would be to limit its implications, for it would seem 
that, just to take a first step, it could apply to all acts of state altering treaty commitments. 
The difficulty would not arise if membership of the EU was in some way legally 
distinguishable from other international positions, as of course is the case, indeed that 
membership is sui generis. However, the way the point found expression in Miller was, not to 
stress that The European Communities Act 1972 was unique,25 but to conclude that it was one 
member of a special category of UK “constitutional statutes.” 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
21 May, supra note 4. 
22 The Government’s position about this is now, it is submitted, as clear as the subject 
permits. DEPARTMENT FOR EXITING THE EUROPEAN UNION, LEGISLATING FOR THE UNITED 
KINGDOM’S WITHDRAWAL FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION (Cm 9946 2017) paras. 2.4-2.25. 
23 Id., paras. 2.1-2.3. 
24 c. 68 (U.K.). See also R. (Factortame) v Secretary of State for Transport (No. 2), 
Case C 213/89 [1991] 1 A.C. 603 (H.L., E.C.J.) (U.K.). 
25 Though it is irrelevant here, I myself believe that the 1972 Act (and subsequent 
related legislation) is of a unique constitutional form and that the Government’s decision to 
give notice by an exercise of the prerogative, whilst perfectly lawful, has been a political 
mistake, for full Parliamentary debate, unaffected by the issues bought up in Miller but 
exposing the extent of the mistake that was made by passing the 1972 Act in the first place, 
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 One of the ways in which the doctrine of sovereignty of Parliament recognises that the 
rule of law ultimately rests, not on law itself, but on the political choices of the members of a 
political society, is to deny that Parliament can bind itself.26 No legal, moral, political or 
whatever position is so settled that it cannot be altered. Parliamentary sovereignty is perfectly 
compatible with belief in the existence of a “higher law” in accord with which Acts of 
Parliament may be interpreted or even outright evaluated, and with attempts to 
constitutionally entrench such law, all of which Dicey acknowledged could have value,27 but 
it denies that such steps either should or possibly could be given a positive legal status that 
could ultimately defeat a political choice to ignore them: “[t]here is no difficulty, and there 
often is very little gain, in declaring the existence of a right to personal freedom. The true 
difficulty is to secure its enforcement.”28 By in this way making the necessity of self-
legislation actual in the Hegelian sense,29 Parliamentary sovereignty charges the members of 
a political society with responsibility for the existence, or non-existence,30 of the rule of law: 
                                                                                                                                                        
would have been welcome. On the nature of this unique legal form as it has now led to Miller 
see David Campbell, Dicey in the Age of Globalisation, 17 EUROPEAN PUBLIC LAW 571 
(2011) (reviewing DANNY NICOL, THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION OF CAPITALISM 
(2010)). I fully acknowledge that in saying this I expose the academic nature of my way of 
looking at the issues, which I fear would be dismissed as such by admirably successful 
practising politicians such as Mrs. May, who has so far managed to stick to her timetable for 
leaving against very powerful opposition. 
[June 11, 2027: See now infra note 144]. 
26 DICEY, supra note 1, 27, 42, 51.  
27 In regard of the point of greatest importance to us here, interpretation, see infra note 
40. 
28 DICEY, supra note 1, 129. 
29 G.W.F. HEGEL, ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 19-22 (Cambridge 
University Press 1991); G.W.F. HEGEL, THE ENCYCLOPAEDIA LOGIC sec. 6 (Hackett 
Publishing 1991). 
30 By far the predominant motif of Dicey’s later political views was that the nineteenth 
century growth of radicalism and collectivism was eroding the rule of law and, supported by 
public opinion favouring this growth, reformers would find in Parliamentary sovereignty “an 
instrument well adapted for the establishment of democratic despotism.” A.V. DICEY, 
LECTURES ON THE RELATION BETWEEN LAW AND PUBLIC OPINION IN ENGLAND IN THE 
NINETEENTH CENTURY 217 (Liberty Fund 2008). 
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“the freedom from legal interference which Englishmen actually enjoy results from the 
prevailing tone of public sentiment rather than from the nature of our laws.”31 
 The obvious implication of this, that there can be “no marked or clear distinction 
between laws which are not fundamental or constitutional and laws which are fundamental or 
constitutional,”32 is precisely what is disputed by those who have influentially argued that the 
UK should substitute for sovereignty of Parliament a “constitutionalism” which purports to 
legally embed higher level law. The member of the senior judiciary who has made this 
argument in terms most conversant with constitutional history and theory arguably has been 
Sir John Laws, a Lord Justice of Appeal,33 and in 2002 in Thoburn v Sunderland City 
Council, a case which we will see became central to Miller, Laws L.J. claimed that the UK 
constitution recognised that there were certain constitutional statutes, of which the European 
Communities Act 1972 was one.34 The specific significance of this in Thoburn was that the 
1972 Act’s special status prevented its implied repeal by subsequent legislation. Clear words 
in primary legislation (or absolutely necessary implication)35 would be needed to amend or 
repeal such an Act. In Miller,36 what nevertheless remains essentially this argument37 was 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
31 A.V. Dicey, The Legal Boundaries of Liberty, 13 FORTNIGHTLY REVIEW (n.s.) 1, 13 
(1868). 
32 DICEY, supra note 1, 52. 
33 John Laws, Is the High Court the Guardian of Fundamental Constitutional Rights?, 
1993 PUBLIC LAW 59; John Laws, Law and Democracy, 1995 PUBLIC LAW 72; John Laws, 
The Constitution: Morals And Rights, 1996 PUBLIC LAW 622. 
34 Thoburn v Sunderland City Council [2002] EWHC 195 (Admin); [2003] QB 151, 
[60]-[64] (D.C.) (U.K.).  
35 R. (Morgan Grenfell and Co. Ltd.) v Special Commissioner of Income Tax [2003] 1 
AC 563, [45] (Lord Hobhouse) (H.L.) (U.K.). 
36 Under the influence of Laws L.J., the UKSC had, prior to Miller, found that the 1972 
Act was a constitutional statute.  R. (Buckinghamshire County Council and others) v 
Secretary of State for Transport [2014] UKSC 3; [2014] 1 W.L.R. 324, [207], [209]. This 
specifically was a finding of Lords Neuberger and Mance, with whom four other Justices, 
including Lord Reed, agreed. This authority is cited unproblematically by the UKSC majority 
in Miller (S.C. [67]), but more substantially discussed by Lord Reed, dissenting (S.C. [228]-
[229]).  
37 See infra note 53. 
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considerably stretched in the course of finding that the 1972 Act’s constitutional status 
shielded it from an exercise of the prerogative power which, it was argued,38 would inevitably 
lead to its repeal, notification leading to withdrawal and withdrawal necessitating repeal (S.C. 
[45]-[67]). In the absence of clear words in the 1972 Act allowing its implied repeal, the 
UKSC found that Parliament had not intended to allow such implied repeal, a fortiori not by 
the exercise of prerogative power, and so the Government would have to secure the passage 
of the requisite primary legislation before giving Art. 50 notice. In essence, in Miller the 
UKSC  instructed the Government to secure the passage of what became the European Union 
(Notification of Withdrawal) Act 201739 as a condition of giving notice. 
 It is perfectly settled, for it follows from an inevitable and valuable aspect of all judicial 
reasoning which Dicey did not dispute,40 that judicial interpretation of Parliamentary 
intention will reflect a background understanding of constitutional and general public values 
and so in a sense one can always say that those values enjoy a special status even under the 
UK constitution. Miller is no exception to this (S.C. [82]), and indeed it must apply a fortiori 
to Miller because two most important examples of it are the interpretive conventions that, not 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
38 See infra text accompanying notes 61-62.  
39 c. 9 (U.K.). 
40 DICEY , supra note 1, 38: 
There is no legal basis for the theory that judges, as exponents of morality, may 
overrule Acts of Parliament. Language which might seem to imply this in reality 
amounts to nothing more than the assertion that the judges when attempting to ascertain 
what is the meaning to be affixed to an Act of Parliament, will presume that Parliament 
did not intend to violate the ordinary rules of morality, or violate the principles of 
international law, and will therefore, whenever possible, give such an interpretation to a 
statutory enactment as may be consistent with the doctrines both of private and 
international morality. 
 I refer a principally U.S. audience to R. v Secretary of State for Social Security ex p. 
JCWI [1997] 1 W.L.R. 275, 292-293 (C.A.) (U.K.) as an example of this thinking in modern 
employment. Finding The Social Security (Persons from Abroad) Miscellaneous Amendment 
Regulations 1996 (S.I. 1996/30) (U.K.) to “necessarily contemplate for some a life so 
destitute that to my mind no civilised nation can tolerate it,” and so to be ultra vires, Simon 
Brown L.J., in the majority in the Court of Appeal, maintained that “[p]rimary legislation 
alone could in my judgement achieve that sorry state of affairs.”  
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only will an Act of Parliament extinguish a prerogative power which it supersedes, but the 
courts will try to interpret an exercise of a prerogative power in a way which does not conflict 
with a statutory provision, both of which follow from the long constitutional history of the 
subjection of the prerogative to sovereignty of Parliament (H.C. [86]). 
 But it is a quite different thing to claim that when a constitutional statute is silent as to 
its implied repeal, then it must have been the intention of the Parliament that passed it that it 
should not be open to such repeal.41 As with the reasoning of Laws L.J. in Thoburn,42 though 
the term “implied repeal” is so embedded, and was so prior to Laws’ L.J.’s use of it,43 that 
avoiding its use would be a mere affectation, that term can be unhelpful; we are merely 
dealing with what should be a simple recognition of what is inevitable when a statute is 
superseded by a later, inconsistent statute. Even if care is taken, as of course it should be, 
expressly to specify the relationship between the two, unspecified issues will always be 
latent, and when they arise they will call for interpretation. There is an absurd paradox, more 
apposite to the science fiction of Philip K. Dick44 than to practical legal reasoning, involved 
in speculating about the 1972 intention of Parliament regarding constitutional statutes when 
no Minister, draftsman, member of either Houses of Parliament, or judge can at that time 
have possibly conceived of such statutes.45 Even endeavouring to put this to one side, the 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
41 I am grateful to Jim Allan and Maimon Schwarzschild, in correspondence with 
whom the argument I am about to make was much clarified. 
42 David Campbell & James Young, The Metric Martyrs and the Entrenchment 
Jurisprudence of Lord Justice Laws, 2002 PUBLIC LAW 399, 402. 
43 A famous example of pre-war use is Ellen Street Estates v Minister of Health [1934] 
1 K.B. 590, 597 (Maugham L.J.) (C.A.) (U.K.). 
44 PHILIP K. DICK, The Minority Report, in 4 COLLECTED STORIES 71 (2000). Dick’s 
plotline, as with all such science fiction plotlines, is, of course, ultimately derived from 
Oedipus Rex. 
45 It is claimed that there is a long, if minor, theme of constitutionalism running through 
English legal history, but, however this is, I think it fair to say that the most generous view of 
when constitutionalism was given (at the time not very) significant post-war expression, not 
in the UK but anywhere in the Commonwealth, could put it no earlier than some 1980s New 
Zealand decisions and extrajudicial utterances by Sir Robin Cooke, as he then was. Fraser v 
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reason the European Communities Act 1972 made no express provision about its implied 
repeal pursuant to an act of state undertaken as an exercise of prerogative power is that it was 
so perfectly obvious that this would be the way that ever leaving the then European 
Economic Community would be done that no-one would have thought of providing for it 
expressly.46 
 One has the uncomfortable feeling that one must have missed something terribly 
important when one says that the 1972 Act was passed some nine months after the UK 
Government had by prerogative power signed The Treaty of Accession47 - a position 
famously described during the interim by Lord Denning M.R. as one in which UK courts 
took “no notice” 48 of The Treaty of Rome - and that the UK’s instrument of ratification was 
deposited the day after the 1972 Act was passed.49 Had the Act failed to pass, it is 
inconceivable that the Treaty would have been ratified, and the UK would then have had to 
disentangle itself from its international commitments. The same sort of procedure would no 
doubt have been followed had the UK’s decision at the 1975 referendum on membership 
been to leave.50  
 The Miller position can, with great respect, be found at all plausible only if one accepts 
the mere petitio principii on which it rests. If one assumes that there are such things as 
constitutional statutes and if – this easily, indeed inevitably, follows if there are constitutional 
                                                                                                                                                        
State Services Commission [1984] 1 N.Z.L.R. 116, 121 (C.A.) (N.Z.); Sir Robin Cooke, 
Fundamentals, 1988 NEW ZEALAND LAW JOURNAL 158. 
46 On subsequent legislation argued to be relevant, I have nothing to add to the dissent 
of Lord Reed (S.C. [198]-[214]). 
47 Treaty Concerning the Accession of … the United Kingdom … to the European 
Economic Community etc., February 2, 1972, U.K.T.S. 18 (1979). 
48 McWhirter v Attorney General [1972] C.M.L.R. 882, 886 (C.A.) (U.K.). Lord 
Denning’s views were examined in both hearings of Miller only by Lord Reed, dissenting 
(S.C. [174], [183], [225]). 
49 European Communities Act 1972, supra note 24, date of Royal Assent. 
50 Referendum Act 1975 (c. 33) (U.K.). 
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statutes – the European Communities Act 1972 was one, then Miller is fundamentally right.51 
But only if. It is, with respect, highly regrettable that the entire handling of Miller obscures 
the way that it is courts since the passage of the Human Rights Act 1998 that have supplied 
the necessary assumption.52 To be perfectly frank, that the UK constitution contains such 
things as constitutional statutes and that the 1972 Act is one of them can barely be said to be 
argued in Miller. Such argument as there is occupies but two paragraphs of both the High 
Court (H.C. [43]-[44]) and the majority UKSC judgments (S.C. [66]-[67]), though it should 
be said that there is disparate, potentially relevant material to be found elsewhere throughout 
both judgments. The length of the judgments overall, but particularly the time spent on 
constructing Parliament’s intention,53 constitutes a filigree of elaborate construction upon a 
barely laid foundation. If one accepts that there are constitutional statutes, then one may go 
on to ask whether the decision in the case follows. But the very great deal of sophisticated 
reasoning that is involved in doing so does not alter the petitio principii on which the entire 
edifice rests. If, and only if, one thinks there should be constitutional statutes, one may find 
Miller persuasive, and one will certainly find it enormously welcome. In what really is a 
thoroughgoing justification of Dicey’s views, the legal result will be heavily influenced by 
the prevailing tone of legal sentiment. It is unarguable that a belief in constitutionalism and 
against Parliamentary sovereignty has exerted very considerable influence on the 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
51 Though I would, in fact, submit that the quality of much of the reasoning about 
interpretation in Miller is itself evidence of the fallaciousness of that reasoning’s premise. 
52 David Feldman, The Nature and Significance of Constitutional Legislation, 129 LAW 
QUARTERLY REVIEW 343 (2013); David Feldman, Statutory Interpretation and Constitutional 
Legislation, 130 LAW QUARTERLY REVIEW 473 (2014). 
53 What will prove to be for constitutional law in general the most important difference 
between Laws L.J.’s argument and the arguments of the High Court and the UKSC majority 
in Miller is the basis in which the 1972 Act, or any Act, may be found to be constitutional, for 
the former’s argument is not based on the intention of Parliament for on the “force of the 
common law.” Thoburn, supra note 34, [63]. 
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development of UK public law since the passage of the Human Rights Act 1998,54 and 
Miller, which now outright creates judicial supremacy, is the latest and most important 
product of that influence.  
 
II. A HYPOTHETICAL BARGAIN? 
 Though the very finding in Miller was unarguably the most extraordinary feature of the 
case, that finding was made possible only because of two other features in themselves 
extraordinary. The first of these is the manner in which the SSEEU argued the case. 
 Putting aside the correctness or otherwise of the outcome of Miller, on the basis of what 
had been regarded as constitutionally settled it was certainly possible to raise the prior issue 
of whether the question posed in the case was even justiciable. In one sense, of course, Mrs. 
Miller having served her claim, the court of first instance had to decide whether the claim 
was admissible, and in that sense the High Court was obliged to make the ultimate ruling. But 
by deciding to hear the case, the High Court made its ultimate ruling in a very different, 
indeed completely opposed, constitutional sense, for by accepting it could and should “clarify 
the procedural steps necessary for the UK to trigger Article 50 in line with the UK 
constitution,”55 the High Court was asserting supremacy over Parliament. The SSEEU did not 
oppose this. 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
54 I have tried to show this in respect of the three very different cases which have come 
to the greatest public attention as assertions of growing judicial power: on A and others v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2004] UKHL 56; [2005] 2 A.C. 68 (U.K.), see 
David Campbell, The Threat of Terror and the Plausibility of Positivism, 2009 PUBLIC LAW 
501; on Thoburn, supra note 34, see Campbell & Young, supra note 42; and on [Soria] v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department, Asylum and Immigration Tribunal, 
IA/14578/2008, September 24, 2008 (Immigration Judge Devittie), see David Campbell, 
“Catgate” and the Challenge to Parliamentary Sovereignty in Immigration Law, 2015 
PUBLIC LAW 426. 
55 Supra note 12. 
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 Nor did the SSEEU challenge that Mrs. Miller and Mr. Dos Santos had standing to 
bring their action. As, acknowledging that I remain rooted in an earlier way of viewing the 
issues derived from Dicey, I cannot see how they did have standing, and as the SSEU’s 
absence of argument means the issue was never canvassed, I am afraid I am unable 
completely to enlighten the readers of this article on this point. The applicants of course 
argued that Brexit would cause them to lose at least some important rights derived from 
membership of the EU, as was so incontrovertibly the case that the time spent on the point 
throughout the Miller judgments seems, with respect, merely a distraction. This loss of rights 
seems to be the basis on which they were thought to have standing: “[i]t is not difficult to 
identify people with standing to bring the challenge since virtually everyone in the UK or 
with British citizenship will … have their legal rights affected if notice is given” (H.C. [7]). 
But the obverse of this argument is that the claimants were indeed no different to any other 
UK citizen, and that, by passing the European Referendum Act 2015,56 Parliament had 
decided that the procedure by which all such rights of all UK citizens would be determined 
would be by referendum. There have been very many public expressions of concern about the 
wisdom of this referendum, and about the wisdom of referendums in general. But all this 
should be irrelevant to judicial review of irrationality, and there was no argument that the 
vote had been improperly conducted. Mrs. Miller and Mr. Dos Santos suffered no prejudice 
and, really, all one can say is that the ground on which their application was heard seems to 
be that it would be a jolly good thing to hear it. 
 Nevertheless, that the SSEEU did not challenge Mrs. Miller’s standing is, in a most 
important adversarial sense, not at all difficult to understand. A process of, it can fairly be 
said, very extensive liberalisation of the standing requirement, to the point where it is all but 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
56 c. 36 (U.K.). 
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extinguished in reported cases,57 which began in the 1970s but has been much accelerated by 
the passage of the Human Rights Act, has been a principal feature of modern British judicial 
review. To attempt to row against this tide could easily be imagined to be not merely fruitless 
but frivolous.58 Nevertheless, the question whether “the applicant has no interest whatsoever 
and is, in truth, no more than a meddlesome busybody”59 was one of great public interest in 
Miller, and it would merely show where we now are if raising it was, as it may very 
understandably have been, unthinkable or thought definitely unwise. 
 The SSEEU did not even challenge the argument that, once the UK had given notice to 
leave, then leaving was irreversible (S.C. [10]). I am unsure whether maintaining this was 
essential to the applicants’ case, but it incontrovertibly greatly strengthened it, for if 
Parliament’s effective scrutiny, if I may put it this way, of the notification was to lie in a 
subsequent refusal to pass requisite domestic legislation, then irreversibility would nullify 
such scrutiny.60 I am anxious not to use inflammatory language so I am denied the words 
really appropriate to describe this argument, but I am obliged to say I can give no credence 
whatsoever to the idea that it would ever be possible to impose by operation of law a 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
57 CAROL HARLOW AND RICHARD RAWLINGS, LAW AND ADMINISTRATION 699 note 121 
(3rd ed. 2009): “A single decision, R v Secretary of State for the Environment, ex p. Rose 
Theatre Trust Co. [1990] 1 Q.B. 504 [(Q.B.D.) (U.K.)], exhibited a different judicial 
attitude.”  
58 Earlier attempts to review the UK’s possible decision to accede to, as opposed to 
Miller’s challenge to a decision to withdraw from, what is now the EU had been heard but 
failed largely because the issues raised were not held to be justiciable. Blackburn v Attorney 
General [1971] 1 W.L.R. 1037 (C.A.) (U.K.); McWhirter v Attorney General [1972] 
C.M.L.R. 882 (C.A.) (U.K.); R. v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, 
ex p. Rees-Mogg [1994] Q.B. 552 (D.C.) (U.K.). Blackburn and McWhirter were indeed 
important cases in the liberalisation of standing heard by the leading early proponent of that 
liberation, Lord Denning M.R. 
59 R v Monopolies and Mergers Commission, ex p. Argyll Group plc. [1986] 1 W.L.R. 
763, 773H (Sir John Donaldson M.R.) (C.A.) (U.K.). 
60 This argument was accepted by the High Court (H.C. [11], [17]) and, somewhat 
obliquely, the majority in the UKSC (S.C. [94]-[100]), but was subjected to, in my opinion, a 




(perpetual) situation in which the UK would be both internationally outside and domestically 
inside the EU (H.C. [14]). 
 Putting this aside, it is not only that Art. 50(5) TEU specifically provides that a state 
which has withdrawn may subsequently apply to rejoin; nor that Art. 50 is silent on the 
possibility of revoking a notice to leave and so does not expressly forbid it, when 
irreversibility surely requires the latter as a necessary (if not sufficient) condition; nor even 
that this silence requires that Art. 50 be interpreted in light of Art. 68 of the Vienna 
Convention,61 which expressly provides for revocation.62 It is that it cannot be seriously 
maintained that if the UK wished to revoke, say by the current Government being obliged to 
hold a General Election which led to the formation of a new Government which wished to 
remain,63 the new Government could not revoke. No doubt the EU would, perfectly 
legitimately, raise political difficulty about this, and one can even allow for the purposes of 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
61 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 22, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. 
62 Mr Although one is hardly now sure what it is and is not appropriate to be taken up in 
legal argument, I confine two points to a footnote. First, even the drafter of Art. 50 has made 
it plain that it was intended to allow of revocation. Glenn Campbell, Article 50 Author Lord 
Kerr Says Brexit Not Inevitable, BBC NEWS (Edinburgh), November 3, 2016, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-37852628. Secondly, between the 
High Court and Supreme Court hearings of Miller, one Mr. Jolyon (Jo) Maugham, an English 
Q.C., made an application to review the operation of Art. 50 TEU, apparently particularly 
focusing on reversibility, to the High Court of the Republic of Ireland: Maugham and others 
v Ireland, Record Number 2017 781 P, January 27, 2017. No judgment has been reached as 
the case awaits a ruling on jurisdiction. As I have no idea why Mr. Maugham was allowed to 
make this application, I have no idea what the outcome will be. The case nevertheless holds 
out the delightful prospect that the Irish Supreme Court and the Court of Justice of the 
European Union could find that giving notice to leave is, as a matter of law, reversible. One 
can afford to take this delight because one is sure that, other than the role it played in Miller, 
the whole issue matters not a jot. 
[April 21, 2017: Hoping to influence the UK electorate to treat the General Election 
called by Mrs. May (see infra note 143) as a second Brexit referendum, S. Antonio Tajani, 
the President of the European Parliament, said that if a new Parliament wished to reverse the 
Art. 50 notification, it would face no difficulty in doing so. Dan Roberts and Lisa O’Carroll, 
EU leader: UK Would Be Welcomed Back If Voters Overturn Brexit, THE GUARDIAN 
(London), April 20, 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/apr/20/european-
parliament-will-welcome-britain-back-if-voters-veto-brexit.] 
63 [June 11, 2017: See now infra note 143]. 
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argument that it might politically prevent it, but this is an entirely different matter from it 
being legally impossible to revoke.  
 I do not mention these points as a preliminary to now discussing all the legal issues but 
to indicate how strange was the SSEEU’s manner of argument, simply relinquishing as it did 
these points, some of which undeniably could have been strong.64 But, conscious of writing 
principally for a U.S. legal academic audience, I have wondered whether the “hypothetical 
bargain” analysis, which I believe is ultimately traceable to the early work of Judge Posner65 
and which has since enjoyed wide currency, might cast light on what has happened. For, 
really, if it were to lose the case, things could not have gone much better for the Government 
than they did. Though the decision obliged the Government to secure the passage of an Act of 
Parliament before giving Art. 50 notice, Miller explicitly concluded that “[w]hat form such 
legislation should take is entirely a matter for Parliament … Parliament may decide to content 
itself with a very brief statute” (S.C. [122]). Whether the Government could secure the 
passage at all of what became the European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Act 2017 
was, of course, a political matter. But if Miller was brought with the intention of preventing 
withdrawal by applicants cognisant that a very substantial minority of the members of the 
House of Commons and a very considerable majority of the members of the House of Lords 
would have personally wished to oppose this Act, then it was bound to be fruitless because 
there was no practical political possibility that the Act would not pass. 
 Failure of the Act to pass through the Commons would have obliged the Government to 
call a General Election, and that election would have returned a Commons overwhelmingly in 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
64 So weak is the SSEU’s discussion of the significance of the referendum itself that I 
perhaps should have included it amongst the points I have taken up. It is discussed in James 
Allan’s presentation to the symposium. On the remedy granted see infra note 143 
65 RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE chs. 3-4 (1983). The most concise 
statement of this method of analysis of which I am aware is, however, JULES L. COLEMAN, 
RISKS AND WRONGS 165 (1992).  
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favour of leaving. Privately, if not publicly, acknowledging this, members of the House of 
Commons who opposed Brexit but who believed they would lose their seats if they were 
obliged to fight a General Election on the basis of such opposition, were always going to 
support the Act. The appalling situation in which Mr. Corbyn, the Leader of the Labour 
Party, found himself was pitiable. He was elected to his position by members of the Labour 
Party who are overwhelmingly in favour of remaining and he represents one of the 30% of 
Labour constituencies which voted to remain. His supporters therefore regarded with horror 
and contempt his attempt to marshal his forces in the Commons to support the Act.66 But he 
was obliged to do so because the alternative would have seen a great proportion of the 70% 
of his Parliamentary Party whose constituents, typically unlike their representatives, wished 
to leave, lose their seats at either the General Election which failure to pass the Act would 
have necessitated or at the General Election which must take place by 2020.67 
 The constitutional position of the Lords means that it ultimately must accede to the will 
of the Commons, and so the Lords’ position was, to put it in the interest of brevity far too 
bluntly,68 irrelevant. Much more than this, however, the House of Lords as currently 
constituted, with its majority for remain being a (one assumes not directly intended) result of 
gross political patronage, is held in such public contempt that any serious attempt to frustrate 
the referendum or substantially delay its implementation would have been more likely to lead 
to the abolition of the Lords than the prevention of leaving.69 It is not inconceivable that, in 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
66 Anoosh Chakelian, Is Jeremy Corbyn Losing His Supporters After Voting for Brexit?, 
NEW STATESMAN (London), February 16, 2017, 
http://www.newstatesman.com/politics/uk/2017/02/jeremy-corbyn-losing-his-supporters-
after-voting-brexit. 
67 [See now infra note 142]. 
68 Dicey’s suspicion of democracy was a reason for his opposition to the legislation 
which created this position, and he interpreted that legislation conservatively when giving an 
account of the resultant power of the House of Lords. DICEY, supra note 1, 421-24. 
69 Jon Stone, Consider Abolishing the House of Lords If It Delays Brexit, Former Tory 
Brexit Chief Says, THE INDEPENDENT (London), February 9, 2017, 
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some stronger or weaker form, this point may be tested over the course of the next two years. 
To those, like myself, whose general suspicion of an unelected second chamber has turned to 
disgust as the possibilities of patronage created by the “reform” of the House of Lords by the 
Government of Mr. Tony Blair70 have enthusiastically been seized upon by Mr. Blair and 
succeeding Prime Ministers (though not, so far, Mrs. May), this would be a very valuable 
incidental benefit of Brexit. 
 However, by allowing the Government to draft the shortest possible Act,71 the operative 
part of which was of only forty two words, the UKSC allowed the Government to take 
advantage of rules of Parliamentary procedure which seek to ensure that even oppositional 
debate is confined to the amendment of legislation introduced by the Government rather than 
the rehearing of the principle behind the legislation, and the European Union (Notification of 
Withdrawal) Bill enjoyed what those able to understand the procedure could see immediately 
Miller was decided would be an essentially untroubled passage through Parliament.72 Two 
days of heated debate in the Lords were of far more therapeutic value to their Lordships than 
of significance to the UK electorate.73 
                                                                                                                                                        
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/oliver-letwin-brexit-house-of-lords-article-
50-delay-march-a7571406.html. Mr. Stone is reporting the views of Sir Oliver Letwin, a 
former Conservative Cabinet Minister and still highly influential Conservative Member of the 
House of Commons. 
70 House of Lords Act 1999 (c. 34) (U.K.). 
71 Though not directly relevant here, the Government’s expeditious conduct of its 
business also greatly befitted from the UKSC’s unanimous severe limitation of the possible 
role of the UK’s devolved administrations (S.C. [129]-[130], [133]-[135], [150], [152], [242], 
[243], [282]), which was greeted with disgust by the Scottish National Party: Nicola Sturgeon 
Rallies Towards Second Scottish Indyref after Supreme Court’s Brexit Ruling, ITV NEWS 
(London), January 24, 2017, http://www.itv.com/news/2017-01-24/nicola-sturgeon-hints-at-
second-scottish-indyref-after-surpeme-courts-brexit-ruling/. 
72 U.K. PARLIAMENT, BILL STAGES: EUROPEAN UNION (NOTIFICATION OF 
WITHDRAWAL) ACT 2017, http://services.parliament.uk/bills/2016-
17/europeanunionnotificationofwithdrawal/stages.html.  
73 H.L. Deb. vol. 779 col. 12 (February 20, 2017) to col. 324 (February 21, 2017). 
The views of Mrs. Miller’s leading counsel, Lord Pannick Q.C., are of particular 
interest in this connection. David Pannick unarguably is the most important figure in the 
Miller episode outside of the senior judiciary and the Cabinet. In addition to his role as Mrs. 
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 In our hypothetical bargain, the Government’s consideration for this benefit conferred 
by the UKSC was, of course, conceding, as we have seen, all the points which would have 
denied that the UKSC could create itself as a constitutional court. If, in our hypothetical 
bargain, the Government’s interest in giving notice to leave in line with its timetable for 
leaving took priority over concern about domestic constitutional changes; and if, as it insisted 
and as undoubtedly was the case, the UKSC was not interested in the politics of Brexit but 
wished to establish judicial supremacy, then that bargain happily conforms to the criterion of 
being mutually advantageous which we use to evaluate bargains of any sort.  
 
An Embarrassing Incident 
That the bargain about which I have speculated is purely hypothetical is certainly confirmed 
by an incident which occurred shortly after the High Court judgment in Miller was handed 
down which showed that Lady Hale, who it will be recalled is the Deputy President of the 
UKSC, could be no party to any such bargain. On 9 November 2016, six days after the High 
Court judgment, Lady Hale discussed the constitutional implications of the EU referendum at 
some length when giving the most recent of a distinguished series of annual lectures on legal 
                                                                                                                                                        
Miller’s counsel (he is a partner in one of the most important Barristers’ Chambers in the 
UK), he has been, as a Fellow of All Souls College, a Member of the House of Lords, 
including its Constitution Committee, and a legal columnist for The Times of London, 
exceptionally well placed to exert influence on the issue, as he has on the entire development 
of modern UK human rights law. He strongly, if, he told us, “unenthusiastically,” advocated 
remaining, but as soon as the UKSC had handed down its Miller judgment, he made it 
publicly clear he would support the passage of the legislation it made necessary and, having 
been at the heart of the debate on that legislation, actually became impatient with other 
Lordships who wished to prolong the debate in the forlorn hope of seriously delaying the 
giving of notice to leave. The terms in which he did so show him to have found in Miller 
considerable consolation for a decision to leave which he continued to deplore. Bryan 
Appleyard, He Outgunned May in the Supreme Court But Now He’s Backing Brexit, THE 




topics held in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.74 Having discussed the possibility of the courts 
requiring the Government to pass an Act in order to proceed to give notice, she went on to 
say: 
Another question is whether it would be enough for a simple Act of Parliament to 
authorise the government to give notice, or whether it would have to be a 
comprehensive replacement for the 1972 Act.75 
 This lecture gave rise to strong public demands that Lady Hale should recuse herself 
from the hearing of Miller,76 and a very strong argument for this unarguably may be based on 
the relevant body77 of the senior judiciary’s own Guide to Judicial Conduct.78 This, it is 
submitted, wise course of action would, however, have meant that Lady Hale would have to 
relinquish any ambition she may entertain to succeed Lord Neuberger, whose retirement is 
imminent, as President of the UKSC, and thereby add to the distinction of being the only ever 
woman so far appointed to the UK’s domestic court of final appeal by becoming the first 
woman to become that court’s senior judge.79 She did not recuse herself, nor did the UKSC 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
74 Lady Hale, Sultan Azlan Shah Lecture 2016, The Supreme Court: Guardian of the 
Constitution? (November 6, 2016), 12-13, https://www.supremecourt.uk/docs/speech-
161109.pdf. 
75 Id., 12. 
76 Charles Moore, Lady Hale and Her Supreme Court Colleagues Seem To Have No 
Idea Why So Many Britons Mistrust Our Judges, THE DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), 
November 18, 2016, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/11/18/lady-hale-and-her-
supreme-court-colleagues-seem-to-have-no-idea/. Mr. Moore is one of the UK’s most 
influential journalistic commentators. 
77 H.M. COURTS AND TRIBUNALS SERVICE, THE JUDGES’ COUNCIL, 
https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/about-the-judiciary/the-judiciary-the-government-and-the-
constitution/how-the-judiciary-is-governed/judges-council/. 
78 JUDICIARY OF ENGLAND AND WALES, GUIDE TO JUDICIAL CONDUCT (2016), n.b. para. 
8.1, https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2010/02/guidance-judicial-conduct-
v2016-update.pdf. See also U.K. SUPREME COURT, GUIDE TO JUDICIAL CONDUCT (2009), n.b. 
para. 2.5, https://www.supremecourt.uk/docs/guide-to-judicial_conduct.pdf. The point 
seemed to be acknowledged, without, of course, any reference to the specific case, by Lord 
Neuberger himself: Joshua Rosenberg, Brexit on Trial, THE SPECTATOR (London), December 
3, 2016, https://www.spectator.co.uk/2016/12/brexit-in-the-balance-exactly-what-is-at-stake-
in-the-supreme-court/. 
79 [June 21, 2017: Lady Hale’s appointment to the Presidency has since been 
announced: SUPREME COURT, LADY HALE APPOINTED NEXT PRESIDENT OF SUPREME COURT, 
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acquit itself well when it issued an anodyne defence of her which implausibly evaded the 
issues.80 
 The point which it is sought to make here is, however, that Lady Hale’s possibly “more 
comprehensive replacement” would have made impossible the hypothetical bargain about 
which I have speculated. A comprehensive replacement would have necessitated 
Parliamentary debate on, not the minimal Bill which was introduced, but something which 
invited detailed and lengthy debate which could have wrecked the Government’s timetable 
for leaving, perhaps to the point– it is a matter of political judgment – of requiring a General 
Election. This would have destroyed any hypothetical incentive the Government could have 
had to enter into the hypothetical bargain.  
 The constitutional crisis latent in Lady Hale’s speculation was averted by the precise 
conclusion reached by the UKSC that the form the necessary legislation should take was 
entirely a matter for Parliament. The passage of the majority judgment in full is: 
What form such legislation should take is entirely a matter for Parliament. But, in the 
light of a point made in oral argument, it is right to add that the fact that Parliament 
may decide to content itself with a very brief statute is nothing to the point. There is no 
equivalence between the constitutional importance of a statute, or any other document, 
and its length or complexity. A notice under article 50(2) could no doubt be very short 
indeed, but that would not undermine its momentous significance (S.C. [122]). 
A, one assumes chastened, Lady Hale was, of course, one of those who contributed to the 
majority judgment. 
 
Some Guidance for the Perplexed 
Appearing outside the UKSC immediately after receiving judgment in her case, Mrs. Miller 
understandably cut a proud figure, proclaiming that she had affirmed that “Parliament Alone 
                                                                                                                                                        
ALONGSIDE THREE NEW JUSTICES, June 21 2017, https://www.supremecourt.uk/news/lady-
hale-appointed-next-president-of-supreme-court-alongside-three-new-justices.html.] 
80 U.K. SUPREME COURT, LADY HALE’S LECTURE, THE SUPREME COURT: GUARDIAN OF 




is Sovereign.”81 Aware of her having said many, many things to the effect that the 
referendum result made her “physically sick,”82 I simply discount Mrs. Miller’s profession, in 
light of the limits of her legal success as she understood it, not to have initially wished to 
actually prevent the Government giving notice to leave, in order to examine her claim that 
she had bolstered sovereignty of Parliament. 
 It would appear that Mrs. Miller was of the belief that Parliament is the political 
sovereign of the UK. She was by no means alone in this. Mr. David Lammy, a prominent 
Labour Member of Parliament, was amongst the first after the result of the referendum 
became known to say that that result was not binding on the “sovereign Parliament,” which 
should vote to reverse it.83 The utter fatuity of Miller as a political tactic follows from this 
foolish belief. The result of Miller has been that the Government, if it chose to respect the 
decision of the UKSC, has had to secure the passage of a particular piece of legislation 
through Parliament. But, under the U.K.’s Westminster system, a Parliament which had the 
political will to do so could at any time require the Government to pass something like the 
European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Act 2017 without Miller being necessary. And 
if Parliament did not have the will to do this, then Miller would be fruitless because the 
necessary Act would be passed (though perhaps not, and only with extreme difficulty had the 
UKSC acted on Lady Hale’s speculation about “a comprehensive replacement”). In the end, 
this was the case because it was perceived by most members of both Houses of Parliament, 
Mr. Lammy it seems being one of the exceptions, that the UK’s political sovereign is, not 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
81 Gina Miller on Brexit Ruling: “Parliament Alone is Sovereign,” BBC NEWS 
(London), January 24, 2017, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-38729021. 
82 Gina’s Joy at Victory over Odds … and Trolls, DAILY MIRROR (London), January 25, 
2017, 6. 
83 Will Worley, David Lammy MP Urges Parliament to Reject EU Referendum Result: 





Parliament, but the UK electorate, and that to defy the electorate’s will expressed in the 
decision to leave would, as we have seen, have had grave consequences for the members of 
Parliament who did so. That the members of both Houses of Parliament, a majority of whom, 
we have noted, were personally opposed to the European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) 
Act 2017, overwhelmingly passed it out of fear of the electorate is very welcome evidence of 
the UK constitution’s ability to identify where political sovereignty lies. It was not requiring 
the Act to be passed but that it was all but inevitable (putting aside Lady Hale’s speculation) 
that it would pass that confirmed the UK to be a functioning democracy.  
 Sovereignty of Parliament is the rule of recognition84 of the will of the politically 
sovereign UK electorate, though use of Hart’s term in this connection is misleading in that 
direct recognition of that will is not normally how the UK Parliament, nor indeed the 
electorate, conceives of Parliament’s role in a representative democracy. The EU referendum 
was an exceedingly rare occasion85 on which, by passing the European Union Referendum 
Act 2015, Parliament did conceive of its role as one of direct recognition.86 The politics of 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
84 H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 94-95 (3d ed. 2012). This concept received 
some attention in Miller (S.C. [60], [173], [177], [223]-[227]). 
85 There have only ever been three referendums held on issues affecting the entire UK, 
two on membership of what is now the EU and one on electoral procedure. As the last was 
held only because of party politics in the worst sense rather than as a response to undeniable 
general public concern, it is most accurate to say that the UK has only ever held two 
referendums, both on membership of what is now the EU. 
86 It is incidental to the argument of this article, but Parliament conceived of its role in 
this way because, such was the disparity of the personal views of the members of Parliament 
(i.e. Commons and Lords) and the electorate, that Parliament had failed in its representative 
function, a repetition of the situation acutely analysed by Mr. Enoch Powell M.P. in a 
politically important speech during what proved to be the run-up to the 1975 referendum. J. 
Enoch Powell, Speech at an Election Meeting at the Tamworth College of Further Education 
(June 15, 1970), http://enochpowell.info/Resources/May-June%201970.pdf: 
[M]any electors … find, in a way that perhaps has never happened before, that they 
cannot use their vote to express their wishes on what seem to them the most important 
political questions … the electors find themselves confronted with a virtual unanimity 
between the official parties … The party system seems no longer to do its work of 
offering a choice between policies, and it is not surprising to hear so many demanding 
 27 
 
this, and in particular that Mr. Cameron, the Prime Minister behind the 2015 Act, thought that 
the referendum would never have to be held and that, even if held, it certainly would result in 
a decision to remain,87 and the indisputable intention of a number of the then members of the 
House of Commons and a large number of the then members of the House of Lords to do 
what they could to obstruct the passage of the necessary legislation,88 whilst it may tell one 
something about the way the UK’s political elite thinks it fit to conduct itself, is irrelevant to 
the specific problems posed by Miller. The ultimate reason why Mr. Cameron took the fateful 
line he did was that he believed that Parliament, operating in its normal representative 
democratic fashion, was unable to determine whether the will of the electorate was or was not 
that the UK should continue to be a member of the EU, and so he sought to determine that 
will by recourse to direct recognition. Though wholly unaware of this, in so doing he was 
giving effect to the reasoning of A.V. Dicey, whose putting our understanding of 
Parliamentary sovereignty on an adequate basis did not prevent him from arguing that 
referendums could have a positive role in a constitution of Parliamentary sovereignty89 
because:   
                                                                                                                                                        
that the Parliamentary system itself should be short-circuited, and the people offered the 
direct opportunity to say Yes or No by referendum.  
Mr. Powell was the most influential post-war British politician not to hold high 
Government office and the most controversial major politician of any sort. Claiming, in my 
opinion justifiably, to express widely held concerns about large scale immigration and the 
inevitable loss of British sovereignty consequent upon joining what is now the EU, he was 
anathematised as a racist by the British political elite.  
87 Martin Kettle, The Downfall of David Cameron: A European Tragedy, THE 
GUARDIAN (London), June 24, 2016, 
https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/jun/24/david-cameron-downfall-european-
tragedy; Tom McTague et al., How David Cameron Blew It, December 9, 2016, POLITICO 
(Europe edition), http://www.politico.eu/article/how-david-cameron-lost-brexit-eu-
referendum-prime-minister-campaign-remain-boris-craig-oliver-jim-messina-obama/. 
88 Dan Hodges, Remainers and Brexiteers are Determined to Sabotage the EU Deal, So 
this Could Be Theresa's Last Stand, SUNDAY MIRROR (London), April 2. 2017, 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/debate/article-4372058/DAN-HODGES-Theresa-s-stand.html. 
Mr. Hodges is a Lobby correspondent whose strength is his particular access to “inside” 
information about Westminster. See infra note 144. 
89 DICEY, supra note 1, 474-80. 
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the institution of a Referendum would simply mean the formal acknowledgment of the 
doctrine which lies at the basis of English democracy – that a law depends at bottom for 
its enactment on the assent of the nation as represented by the electors.90 
 Mrs. Miller did not achieve her aim, and has been spared the disappointment flowing 
from this only because she has no idea what that aim actually involved or even meant. Her 
belief that she affirmed that Parliament is sovereign has been realised in litigation by which 
the courts have instructed Parliament what to do, for she does not seem to realise that under 
the Westminster system it is impossible for a court to instruct Government what primary 
legislation it has to pass without that instruction being an instruction to Parliament, on the 
sufferance of which a Government’s continued existence is wholly dependent. After Miller, 
the Government was obliged to introduce the European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) 
Bill, which is precisely what Parliament had decided that the Government should not be 
required to do, and precisely why Mrs. Miller brought her action. The result of Mrs. Miller’s 
case has been that Parliamentary sovereignty has been replaced by judicial supremacy. 
 What advice can one offer to Mrs. Miller in her perplexity? More importantly, what 
guidance can one offer to public opinion which is perplexed in a similar way, though not to a 
similar degree and indeed, having some perception of what has happened, has begun to 
criticise the senior judiciary for what it has done in Miller. To the extent that this criticism 
has been disgracefully expressed and to the extent that it unworthily attributes to the senior 
judiciary the crude political motive of seeking to prevent Brexit,91 it has entirely merited the 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
90 A.V. DICEY, A LEAP IN THE DARK 189 (2d ed. 1911). 
91 James Slack, Enemies of the People: Fury Over “Out of Touch” Judges Who Have 
“Declared War on Democracy” by Defying 17.4m Brexit Voters and Who Could Trigger 
Constitutional Crisis, The Daily Mail (London), November 3, 2016, 
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vehement condemnation it has received from that judiciary.92 But, exceedingly unfortunately, 
such criticism is the future, because the creation of judicial supremacy will inevitably 
ultimately expose the political views of the judiciary to scrutiny of a type which it is a great 
achievement of the UK constitution to have hitherto managed to deny legitimacy. The 
astounding and commendable – it is a great constitutional achievement – degree of public 
confidence which the UK judiciary enjoys has come under considerable attack since the 
passage of the Human Rights Act 1998, and the process of its erosion will be accelerated by 
Miller’s establishment of judicial supremacy.93 This, it is respectfully and regrettably 
submitted, will be the more likely as it emerges in public debate that what has been done in 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
92 The senior judiciary has, in fact, couched its criticism of the media in terms intended 
to show an appreciation of the necessity of a free press, and has reserved its most forcefully 
expressed criticism for those politicians who it believes have responded badly to the media 
coverage, especially the current Lord Chancellor, Ms. Liz Truss, who they believe has failed 
in her constitutional, indeed statutory, duty to protect the independence of the judiciary. This 
judicial criticism would seem to have placed the Lord Chancellor’s continued tenure in her 
post into jeopardy. SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE CONSTITUTION, UNCORRECTED ORAL 
EVIDENCE WITH THE LORD CHIEF JUSTICE (March 22, 2017), Q4, 
http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/constitu
tion-committee/lord-chief-justice/oral/49312.pdf; SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE CONSTITUTION, 
UNCORRECTED ORAL EVIDENCE WITH THE PRESIDENT AND DEPUTY PRESIDENT OF THE 
SUPREME COURT (March 29, 2017), Q7, 
http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/constitu
tion-committee/president-and-deputy-president-of-the-supreme-court/oral/49543.html; 
Francis Elliott et al., Clashes with Judges Leave Truss at Risk of Losing Job, THE TIMES 
(London), April 7, 2017, at 6. 
[June 12, 2017: In the Cabinet reshuffle following the General Election (see infra note 
144), Ms. Truss was removed from her post having held it for less than a year]. 
93 It is highly significant and worrying that even so responsible a figure as Mr. Iain 
Duncan Smith, a former Leader of the Conservative Party, and so then potentially Prime 
Minister, and still extremely influential member of the House of Commons, has already 
called for the vetting by politicians of senior judicial appointments in light of what has been 
done in Miller. Iain Duncan Smith, Why It's Crucial That the Judges Who Could Decide the 
Fate of Brexit Are Scrutinised, THE DAILY MAIL (London), December 7, 2016, 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/debate/article-4007894/IAIN-DUNCAN-SMITH-s-crucial-
judges-decide-fate-Brexit-scrutinised.html. Mr. Duncan Smith’s position is that the UK 
courts’ active involvement of themselves in political issues is irreversible, and, if so, then 
such vetting is also inevitable. Jonathan Morgan, Law, Politics and the Independence of the 
Judiciary in the United Kingdom: Reflections on the “Brexit Litigation.” 25 THE 




Miller has been done, as Mrs. Miller’s own sad state evidences, in a way bound to perplex the 
general public. To the procedural aspect of this I now turn. 
 
III. THE LEGAL PROCEDURE THAT MADE MILLER POSSIBLE 
 I have claimed that the extraordinary finding in Miller was made possible by two 
features of the case in themselves extraordinary, the first being the SSEEU’s manner of 
argument. The second is the civil procedure of the case, at first glance a feature most unlikely 
to ever be described as extraordinary, but in this instance the description is more than 
justified. 
 The basic structure of the most senior domestic courts of England and Wales, and thus 
for our purposes the UK, remains as it was established by the immense reform of the fusion 
of the common law and equity jurisdictions under the nineteenth century Judicature Acts,94 
with the creation of the Supreme Court in 200995 not changing this in a way of relevance to 
us. That basic structure encompasses three levels of court. The High Court, which also is a 
court of appeal from inferior courts and tribunals, is the court of first instance for more 
“complex and difficult” matters. From the High Court there is appeal to the Court of Appeal, 
from which there is final domestic appeal to the Supreme Court. The general jurisdiction of 
the High Court has three Divisions: the Chancery Division, the Queen’s Bench Division and 
the Family Division.96 There are specialist courts within these Divisions, and the 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
94 Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1873 (36 & 37 Vict. c. 66) (U.K.), Supreme Court 
of Judicature Act 1975 (38 & 39 Vict. c. 77) (U.K.) and the Appellate Jurisdiction Act 1879 
(39 & 40 Vict. c. 59) (U.K.). 
95 Constitutional Reform Act 2005 Pt. 3 (c. 4) (U.K.) and Constitutional Reform Act 
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Administrative Court, which hears most judicial review applications, is a specialist court of 
the Queen’s Bench Division.97 
 The first instance hearing of Miller did indeed take place in the London seat of the 
Administrative Court in the Royal Courts of Justice, and the official transcript of this 
judgment, which indeed tells us that it was a matter “In the High Court of Justice, Queen’s 
Bench Division,” bears the Neutral Citation Number [2016] EWHC 2768 (Admin). Public 
debate about Miller has been based on the belief that it began as a “High Court” case. This 
belief is mistaken in a very important way. 
 The High Court judiciary is mainly composed of up to eighty puisne Justices of the 
High Court, plus some Deputy High Court judges who sit in inferior courts as well as the 
High Court in process of being elevated to the High Court.98 In normal High Court 
proceedings, one of these sits alone.99 These judges are highly distinguished, almost always 
having had considerable experience of judging in the inferior courts and tribunals from which 
they are recruited, as well, of course, as having experience of distinguished legal practice, 
academic entry to the senior judiciary being vestigial. Six even more senior judges are also 
members of the High Court, the most important of whom is the Lord Chief Justice, the Head 
of the Judiciary of England and Wales.100 The Lord Chief Justice’s duties are predominantly 
administrative, as is to be expected when being responsible for the judicial function in higher 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
97 H.M. COURTS AND TRIBUNALS SERVICE, THE ADMINISTRATIVE COURT, 
https://www.gov.uk/courts-tribunals/administrative-court  
98 Senior Courts Act 1981, supra note 96, s. 4(1)(e). See also H.M. COURTS AND 
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proceedings other than in the UKSC is but one of a large number of such duties, but in regard 
of his101 own duties as a judge, and putting to one side the exceptional occasions when the 
Lord Chief Justice has sat as an “acting” judge of the Supreme Court, he sits in the Court of 
Appeal or the High Court.102 His time is of course focused upon matters of particular gravity, 
and he therefore principally sits in the Court of Appeal and his role in the High Court is to sit 
as a member of the Divisional Court, which will be described below. I speak only on the 
basis of the experience of forty years of study rather relying on the result of any research 
focused on the issue when I say I am aware of only three reported cases in which the Lord 
Chief Justice sat as sole judge in the High Court,103 all of which were cases of particular 
public importance. The Lord Chief Justice is not only a member of the Court of Appeal but is 
President of its Criminal Division. The President of the Civil Division is the Master of the 
Rolls,104 second only to the Lord Chief Justice in importance amongst the judiciary of 
England and Wales.105 
 When some criminal or judicial review matters which are required to be heard by the 
High Court but are of a particular complexity or gravity, the bench may be of two or more 
judges,106 and this specially constituted bench is called a Divisional Court.107 A three member 
bench is, however, rare,108 and a Divisional Court is usually composed of a High Court judge 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
101 There has never been a female Lord Chief Justice. 
102 Senior Courts Act 1981, supra note 96, ss. 2(2)(d), 4(1)(b) 
103 Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain v Boots Cash Chemists (Southern) Ltd. 
[1952] 2 Q.B. 795 (Lord Goddard C.J.) (Q.B.D.) (U.K.); Smith v Leech Brain and Co. Ltd. 
[1962] 2 Q.B. 405 (Lord Parker C.J.) (Q.B.D.) (U.K.); Attorney General v Jonathan Cape 
Ltd. [1976] Q.B. 752 (Lord Widgery C.J.) (Q.B.D.) (U.K.). 
104 Senior Courts Act 1981, supra note 96, s. 3(2). 
105 H.M. COURTS AND TRIBUNALS SERVICE, MASTER OF THE ROLLS, 
https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/about-the-judiciary/who-are-the-judiciary/judicial-
roles/judges/profile-mor/  
106 Senior Courts Act 1981, supra note 96, s. 19(3)(a). 
107 Id., s. 66.  
108 See infra note 110. 
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and a more senior judge drawn from the Court of Appeal. Thoburn109 was a paradigm 
instance of the Administrative Court sitting as a Divisional Court, being a judicial review 
matter in which Crane J., a High Court judge, simply agreed with the senior Laws L.J., who 
was no doubt asked to sit because of his particular interest in constitutional matters.  
 The official transcript of the first instance judgment in Miller tells us that the court was 
a Divisional Court, and more legally sophisticated comment has referred to the case, not as a 
matter before the High Court, but as a matter before the Divisional Court. The bench that 
heard Miller at first instance was, however, composed of Lord Thomas of Cwmgeidd C.J., 
the Lord Chief Justice, Sir Terence Etherington M.R., the Master of the Rolls, and Sir Philip 
Sales L.J., a Lord Justice of Appeal. No puisne justice of the High Court was involved. Not 
merely would it be very misleading to describe this bench as a High Court bench, but I am 
unaware of any Divisional Court ever previously being of such a composition.110 This was, in 
fact, a first instance hearing by the Court of Appeal, and indeed by a bench of that court 
which was as distinguished as one can really conceive, not only because of the eminence of 
the Lord Chief Justice and the Master of the Rolls, but because Sales L.J., whose previous 
career included distinguished service as the senior legal representative of the Crown,111 was 
particularly fit to hear this case. I believe this way of handling an application for judicial 
review, indeed of any civil matter, is unique in post-war English legal history, differences 
with earlier legal procedure making any wider ranging claim impossible. 
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 Any decision of this court would be bound to be regarded as extremely authoritative, 
but the power of this decision was increased by it being, still unusually, handed down as a 
single judgment. Nevertheless, from the outset there was never any doubt on the part of any 
legally informed commentator that that judgment, whatever it was, would be appealed to the 
Supreme Court.112 (An ultimate outcome that the extreme distinction of the so-called High 
Court made really quite inconceivable was that the UKSC would find that the High Court 
was wrong to take the matter in the first place.) The reader will immediately see that the 
normal three level court system was thereby reduced to two levels. In the very first Practice 
Direction it issued, the UKSC retained the longstanding practice of “exceptionally” allowing 
“leapfrog” appeals in civil matters from the High Court direct to itself,113 the statutory power 
enabling this specifying that the appeal may be from either “proceedings before a single 
judge of the High Court … or … a Divisional Court.”114 The nature of the bench which heard 
Miller at first instance surely strains this conception of a leapfrog appeal. The leapfrog is, of 
course, intended to be over the Court of Appeal, as is emphasised by a later practice direction 
stipulating that when leave to make such an appeal is sought because “the proceedings entail 
a decision relating to a matter of national importance or consideration of such a matter,”115 
then leave should be granted “only … where … it does not appear likely that any additional 
assistance could be derived from a judgment of the Court of Appeal.”116 This would not, of 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
112 I am at a loss to explain Mrs. Miller’s widely reported comments that she was 
“baffled” by the Government’s decision to appeal. Sara Spary, Gina Miller Says She Is 
“Baffled” By Government Brexit Appeal, BUZZFEED NEWS, November 8, 2016, 
https://www.buzzfeed.com/saraspary/gina-miller-says-she-is-baffled-by-government-brexit-
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113 SUPREME COURT, PRACTICE DIRECTION 1, para. 1.2.17, 
https://www.supremecourt.uk/procedures/practice-direction-01.html. 
114 Administration of Justice Act 1969 s. 12(2) (c. 58) (U.K.). 
115 SUPREME COURT, PRACTICE DIRECTION 3, para. 3.6.12, 
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116 SUPREME COURT, PRACTICE DIRECTION 3, id., para. 3.6.12.c. 
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course, be likely in Miller, as an effective Court of Appeal which was, as we have seen, as 
distinguished as one can really conceive, had already heard the case. Any other Court of 
Appeal would be of less standing. It was, in fact, impossible for the Court of Appeal as such 
to hear Miller. 
 Further extraordinary procedural features were added to Miller at the Supreme Court 
hearing. The UKSC may have twelve Justices117 and currently there are eleven.118 The UKSC 
normally sits as a bench of five, though seven is by no means unknown. Miller was heard by 
all eleven Justices. This was not only the sole occasion so far on which the Court has sat en 
banc but it was the largest bench ever assembled in the UK’s domestic court of final appeal 
in modern times.119 The but recently entirely refurbished premises of the UKSC could not 
comfortably accommodate, not merely the public,120 but those participating in the hearing,121 
for, judged conservatively and leaving aside those concerned with a specifically Northern 
Irish issue, the Appellant, two Respondents, one interested party and five interveners had the 
benefit of over fifty legal representatives, including twenty two Q.C.s! Over 20,000 pages of 
documents supported the arguments of this multitude (S.C. [275]), with additional academic 
arguments also playing a part (S.C. [11]). What is more, the physical bench itself had to be 
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modified to allow even all the Justices themselves a comfortable seat!122 The proceedings 
were in various ways televised, but it should be said that, though the extent of coverage was 
unprecedented, televisation has become a quite common feature of UKSC proceedings. That 
the entire matter was just gone through again emerges even more clearly from the written 
arguments of the parties and the full transcript of the hearing which have been made publicly 
available.123 
 What these spectacles in the High Court and the UKSC amount to is, it is submitted, the 
creation of a UK constitutional court. Though, as we have seen, the point was not argued, 
taking Miller at all, regardless of what was decided, asserted judicial supremacy in the UK, 
and the court arrangements that made this possible were absolutely unprecedented in modern 
English legal history. It is unarguable that doing this strained the statutory authority for 
making any such arrangements, but this is not really the right way to approach the criticism 
that must be made of what was done. The arrangements for the conduct of the business of the 
senior courts are rightly left very flexible, and indeed I do not think I can have sufficiently 
conveyed the flexibility that lies behind the arrangements for the specialist Administrative 
Court, despite the length at which I have tried to do so. But this flexibility imposes a grave 
duty – it amounts to a constitutional convention - on the senior judiciary to manage the 
business of the courts in the public interest. By arranging the hearings of Miller in such a way 
as to create the forum of a constitutional court which made possible, and indeed was 
appropriate to the magnificence of, those hearings, without any public discussion whatsoever 
of whether a constitutional court should be created, is, with great respect, a momentous 
failure to perform that duty. The public ignorance of what has been done is nowhere better 
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evidenced than in the way that the first hearing of Miller continues to be understood to have 
been a hearing in the High Court when it really was nothing of the sort. 
 But all good things must come to an end, and if and when this ignorance is dissipated, 
the senior judiciary will find it has eroded the very public confidence in the judiciary’s 
conduct of the business of the courts which allowed the packing of the Miller benches with 
judges of the highest rank and distinction as a peculiarly self-absorbed way of legitimating 
the decisions taken, and this way of proceeding will no longer be allowed to be good enough. 
This act of acute self-harm by an independent senior judiciary is entirely consistent with the 
post-war abandonment of the most successful political culture of modern history by the 
U.K.’s ruling elites, in the process of which the now failed attempt to cede British 
sovereignty to the E.U. had seemed to be the ultimate self-abasement. Surely the most 
important passage of Lord Reed’s dissent, the wisdom of which stands out even amongst 
those words, is that: “[i]t is important for courts to understand that the legalisation of political 
issues is not always constitutionally appropriate, and may be fraught with risk, not least for 
the judiciary” (S.C. [240]). 
 
Similar Fact Evidence 
One imagines it will never become publicly known what in any detail was the procedural 
reasoning behind setting up the Miller hearings in this way. One can nevertheless be sure 
that, in addition to the Lord Chief Justice and the Master of the Rolls, David Neuberger, 
Baron Neuberger of Abbotsbury, The President of the UKSC, will have played a major part. 
If so, this would not have been the first time Lord Neuberger had taken an innovative line 
with judicial procedure in order to bring about a change to the law he thought desirable which 
one doubts would have survived public debate. I have discussed this other episode elsewhere 
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and I will give but the briefest account of it here, referring the reader to that discussion for 
further detail and authority.124 
 Fundamental reform to civil procedure at the turn of the twentieth century allowed civil 
litigation to be funded by variants of contingency fee previously unknown or prohibited in the 
UK. This led to an explosion in personal injury claims and litigation which even those in 
favour of the personal injury system and of funding this litigation, including the author of the 
reforms himself, found to be of great concern. The conduct of the legal profession which lost, 
and still has not begun to regain, any defensible balance between pursuit of the public interest 
and pursuit of fee income drew particular criticism. A most authoritative review of the 
situation which the Government commissioned an eminent member of the senior judiciary to 
undertake led to the proposals that the fee arrangements which had been brought into 
disrepute be abolished or radically modified but, so as to ensure that the funding for litigation 
was not overall reduced, damages for personal injury be increased. The first, reducing, 
proposal, was brought about by statute. No legislative provision was made for the second, 
increasing, proposal. But, following an, I think it fair to say, at the time astonishing 2001 
Court of Appeal decision, which the Law Commissioner who played a major role in bringing 
the decision about has since defended as a way of using the courts to effectively pass 
legislation which it is likely that Parliament would not, this proposal was given effect by the 
2012 Court of Appeal decision in Simmons v Castle.125 
 In Simmons v Castle, Court of Appeal approval of a personal injury damages settlement 
of a sort which would normally be dealt with a single Lord Justice of Appeal on papers was 
used as the occasion to uplift the relevant damages in every case across England and Wales 
by 10%. Unlike the 2001 case, the hearing of which had some of the C.B. de Mille quality of 
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Miller, Simmons v Castle was a most austere affair reminiscent of Samuel Beckett. The case 
was not in a most important sense even actually heard because the interests of the nominal 
parties played no part and there was no argument whatsoever before the court. A most 
impressive bench nevertheless was assembled, not to hear this case, but to use the pretext of 
doing so to engage in this act of judicial legislation, comprising of the Lord Chief Justice, the 
Master of the Rolls and a distinguished Lord Justice of Appeal. The Master of the Rolls at 
that time, who as President of the Civil Division of the Court of Appeal was primarily 
responsible for these arrangements, was Baron Neuberger of Abbotsbury. After Miller, Lord 
Neuberger, who must now be regarded as the U.K.’s John Marshall, will look upon Simmons 
v Castle as a very ordinary achievement indeed. 
  
CONCLUSION: MILLER AND MARBURY V MADISON  
At the moment, the power of the UK senior judiciary is far greater than it has ever been in 
modern English legal history. The passage of the Human Rights Act 1998 has given the 
courts an express power to strike down secondary legislation, declare primary legislation 
incompatible with binding human rights laws, and, it has been authoritatively and in my 
opinion persuasively argued, an effective power to alter by interpretation the legal position 
created by primary legislation that in very important ways exceeds even the power to strike 
down of the US Supreme Court.126 All this has been, however, ultimately dependent on the 
acquiescence of the Government and Parliament, for, leaving aside other issues, in the end 
Parliament could repeal the 1998 Act (and pass domestic legislation necessary to deal with 
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the UK’s withdrawal from the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union127 and 
the European Convention of Human Rights). But, with Miller, outright judicial supremacy 
has been asserted. This is, of course, as yet a merely nascent development. However, no-one 
who has witnessed the growth in human rights jurisprudence in the UK over the merely 
twenty years since the passage of the 1998 Act can doubt that Miller will grow.  
 I will conclude by going so far as to predict the line the next and further assertion of 
judicial supremacy will take. Restoring legal sovereignty to the UK Parliament will, of 
course, be an enormous, as distinct from complex, undertaking, quite impossible if 
Parliament has to actively debate all the legislative changes, which, therefore, will in large 
part have to be made by just the sort of secondary legislation which was the focus of Laws 
L.J.’s judgment in Thoburn. This has been obvious to anyone competent to understand the 
issues from the moment the EU referendum was canvassed, and in Parliamentary debate 
following the publication, the day after the UK gave notice of its intention to leave, of the 
Command Paper128 intended to stimulate consultation over the legislation necessary to give 
effect to that notice, the SSEEU acknowledged this to be the case.129 The publication of this 
Command Paper nevertheless instantly gave rise to the criticism by politicians130 and media 
commentators131 that the Government proposed to make improper use of secondary 
legislation. The debate has been handicapped from the outset because the precise legislative 
device at the heart of the matter, the Henry VIII clause, enjoys a similarly long pedigree in 
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129 H.C. Deb. vol. 624 col. 433 (March 30, 2017) (Mr. David Davis, Secretary of State 
for Exiting the European Union). 
130 Clive Lewis, Article 50 is Going to give Theresa May the Powers of a Monarch 
Under “Henry VIII clauses,” INDEPENDENT (London), March 30, 2017, 
http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/article-50-great-repeal-bill-eu-law-henry-viii-powers-
what-happens-next-a7655331.html. Mr. Lewis is the Labour Party Member of Parliament for 
Norwich South.  
131 Lucy Fisher et al., Davis Accused of Power Grab as He Seeks Free Hand Over EU 
Law, TIMES (London), March 31, 2017, at 12. 
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English constitutional law to the Royal prerogative, and the way this pedigree has been seized 
upon by the uncomprehending as an ipso facto objectionable feature of the Government’s 
legislative programme is a dispiriting example of déjà vu all over again.132 
 It cannot reasonably be denied that Henry VIII clauses, and secondary legislation in 
general, are open to abuse, and have been abused, by UK governments of all political hues, in 
order to shield controversial proposals from Parliamentary and public debate. Thoburn133 
itself concerned a deplorable example of this, though this aspect of the case seemed to escape 
the attention of a Divisional Court’s preoccupied with constitutional innovation.134 Nor can it 
be denied that, so long as government is conducted at anything remotely like the scale it is 
now is in the UK, the widespread use of such clauses and such legislation is inevitable and in 
this sense normal. Apart from the size of the legislative task of leaving the EU, there is 
nothing about any of this specific to Brexit, nothing that is not a part of the passage of 
legislation in the course of the modern conduct of government.135 But nor, of course, was 
there anything specific to giving notice under Art. 50 that was not part of the modern conduct 
of foreign policy, and that did not stop the senior judiciary doing what it did in Miller. 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
132 H.C. Deb. vol. 624 col. 433-34 (March 30, 2017) (Mr. Stephen Gethins). Mr. 
Gethins is a Scottish Nationalist member of the House of Commons whose contribution to the 
debate on the Government’s proposed legislation wittily invoked the rhetoric of perceived 
historical grievance so beloved of those who share his views. A reader who wishes to 
understand that rhetoric should consult MARCUS MERRIMAN, THE ROUGH WOOINGS: MARY 
QUEEN OF SCOTS 1542-1551 (2000). 
133 Supra note 38. 
134 Campbell & Young, supra note 42. 
135 In fact, whilst I am anxious to avoid complacency about this, the intense focus of the 
public and Parliament on Brexit will mean that the potential for abuse of secondary 
legislation will be less likely over this issue than is commonly the case. This will be a marked 
change to the generally low level of scrutiny of the most extensive use, pursuant to the 
European Communities Act 1972, supra note 24, s. 2(2), of secondary legislation in order to 
join what is now the EU. s.2(2), which was “as inevitable as it was notorious”, has been 
authoritatively described as a “significant example” of modern laxity in legislative drafting 




 Showing an awareness of recondite elements of UK constitutional and administrative 
law most surprising and admirable in one who did not complete her LL.B. studies at what is 
now the University of East London and who, prior to coming to legal eminence through 
Brexit, does not seem to have had any particular interest in constitutional matters,136 Mrs. 
Miller also instantly declared herself to be “profoundly worried” by the possible use of Henry 
VIII clauses, which she saw raising the same threat of the Government using ancient powers 
to try “to bypass Parliament”137 as she had detected in the use of the Royal prerogative to 
carry out acts of state.138 Having already spent between £200,000 and £300,000 on her case139 
and having said she “can’t think of anything better” to do with her great wealth than to 
continue the good legal fight, Mrs. Miller, who is also in other regards a philanthropist, is 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
136 Shining The Spotlight On Gina Miller, THE GUYANA PREMIER, February 2, 2017, 
http://www.guyanapremier.com/single-post/2017/01/31/SHINING-THE-SPOTLIGHT-ON-
GINA-MILLER. This interest in Mrs. Miller arises because, though a British citizen, she was 
born in what was then British Guyana and spent her childhood in the newly independent 
Guyana. 
137 Gina Miller, Triggering Article 50 Without Parliament Getting a Say Would Set a 
Precedent for Autocracy, New Statesman (London), January 9, 2017, 
http://www.newstatesman.com/politics/staggers/2017/01/triggering-article-50-without-
parliament-getting-say-would-set-precedent. 
138 I hope the reader will excuse my entering something of a personal note. In debate on 
the Government’s Command Paper, Mrs. Helen Goodman claimed that “The public are 
extremely worried about these Henry VIII clauses.” H.C. Deb. vol. 624 col. 441, March 30, 
2017. Mrs. Goodman’s is the Labour Member of the House of Commons for Bishop 
Auckland in the North East of England, where my wife and I live. I have written columns for 
a local newspaper seeking, without noticeable success, to alert the public to the 
Government’s abuse of secondary legislation in order to bring about by undemocratic means 
the major programme of changes to local government on which it is currently embarked, 
changes which will effect the entire North of England. Nevertheless, despite the profound 
depth of my engagement with such issues, I myself have not detected this public concern 
about Henry VIII clauses. 
139 Michael Savage, Scourge of Brexiteers Promises to Fight On, THE TIMES (London), 
March 3, 2017, at 10. This expense appears to have been incurred despite, one imagines, Mrs. 
Miller being awarded her legal costs under the usual rule in England and Wales. The 
Government has not so far made public the expense it has incurred arguing Miller, and 
though it has said it will do so, it has also said it has kept no full record of these costs. Ben 
Kentish, Government Does Not Know Full Cost of Its Article 50 Legal Challenge Due To 





now contemplating again “going to court to get a ruling” over the legislation outlined in the 
Command Paper.140 
 Were the Government to secure the passage through Parliament of competently drafted 
enabling legislation granting the necessary powers, Mrs. Miller would face different and, one 
would have said, but who now really knows, harder legal obstacles. It is evident, however, 
that she believes that what she has achieved is a power of the courts to regulate Parliamentary 
procedure, telling Parliament what it needs to do in line with sovereignty of Parliament as 
determined by the courts, and so these obstacles will hardly appear insuperable to her. I write 
this article because there is a very strong possibility that, in the legal realist sense,141 she has 
grasped the legal zeitgeist and she is right. She may have drawn succour, if her remarkable 
legal acuity encompasses keeping abreast of the scrutiny of constitutional matters by 
Parliamentary Select Committee, from Lord Neuberger’s evidence to the Lords Committee 
on the Constitution given on the day the UK gave notice to leave, that the future use of 
secondary legislation to alter, rather than merely receive, the EU acquis gives rise to “a 
possibility of increased litigation.”142 
 Lord Neuberger saw all this as a prospect remote in time, and as it will be two years 
before the UK can alter any part of the acquis, one can understand how he was able to say so. 
But the relief granted in Miller was, as it had to be, declaratory (H.C. [109]),143 and, having 
succeeded in one application for declaratory relief, perhaps Mrs. Miller now sees no need to 
bide her time before embarking on her next act of constitutional philanthropy. A good time to 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
140 Fisher et al., supra note 131. 
141 O.W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARVARD LAW REVIEW 457, 460-61 (1897). 
142 SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE CONSTITUTION, UNCORRECTED ORAL EVIDENCE WITH 
THE PRESIDENT AND DEPUTY PRESIDENT OF THE SUPREME COURT, supra note 92, Q1. Lord 
Neuberger’s views rest on a point arising from the Human Rights Act 1999 which is not 
directly relevant to us.  
143 The SSEEU did not object to this relief, always unusually granted and in this case 
sui generis. I myself would accept, however, that, as the High Court maintained, if Miller was 
to be heard at all, the nature of the relief follows.  
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do so from her perspective will be when the Great Repeal Bill is introduced in Parliament, 
which must be well within the next two years.144 It was not until over more than a decade had 
passed after Marbury v Madison that the US Supreme Court first reversed a decision of a 
state court,145 and it was more than half a century before it again struck down a Federal 
statute.146 I predict that the new UK constitutional court will not take nearly so long to tell the 
UK Government, Parliament and electorate how it should go about using Henry VIII clauses 
in the course of leaving the EU. The process of doing so may well have been initiated before 
this article appears in print. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
144 [June 11, 2017. On April 19, four days after the Symposium was held, Mrs. May 
called in Parliament for a General Election. H.C. Deb. vol. 624 col. 681 (April 19, 2017). As 
nothing seemed to have changed, unless it was that her position had by then grown stronger, 
since the earliest days of her Government, during which she maintained that she would not 
call an Election, the political commentariat was at a loss to explain her decision. Joe Watts, 
Theresa May Shocks Brexit Britain with Snap Election She Said She'd Never Call For, THE 
INDEPENDENT (London), April 18, 2017, 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/theresa-may-election-2017-uk-pm-shocks-
nation-with-promise-breaking-vote-a7689911.html. At the time I formed the belief, or should 
say, in the complete absence of actual information, the speculation, that she had received 
advice about just how much real trouble a Parliament composed as it was could cause given 
the opportunity to do so by a UKSC judgment about the Great Repeal Bill, and was looking 
to obtain an overwhelming Commons majority which supported Brexit. 
The Election, held on June 8, 2017, was a disaster for Mrs. May. Colin Rallings and 
Michael Thrasher, The New Political Map of the U.K., THE SUNDAY TIMES (London), June 
11, 2017, at 16. Far from increasing her majority, much less inflicting a huge defeat on the 
Labour Party as at one time seemed likely, she lost her majority in the Commons, and the 
Conservatives remaining largest party by far was no consolation as she has had to enter into 
negotiations to form a coalition government. The electorate would appear to have believed 
Mr. Corbyn’s pledge that the Labour Party will support Brexit, which in my opinion it will do 
only in such a way that support will be indistinguishable from opposition. 
Mrs. May remains Prime Minister only because there is no alternative in the short term 
and her resignation in humiliation is but a matter of time. There can be no doubt that 
managing the Parliamentary business of Brexit will now become immensely difficult and, in 
my opinion, were it not impossible anyway, the further Supreme Court case contemplated by 
Mrs. Miller or her ilk will make it impossible. I am afraid I cannot tell a US, or indeed any, 
audience where this will go. Anyone who purports to do so at the moment is either a liar or a 
fool.] 
145 Martin v Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. 304 (1816).  




I have left the sentence associated with note 5 and related passages of this article as I drafted 
them in November 2016 as the arrangements for the UKSC hearing of Miller became public. 
At that time I believed the point about the constitutional court to be original to myself. 
Between that time and the submission of the paper to the Symposium organisers in early 
April 2017, I have become aware that the same language has been publicly employed, though 
not, to my knowledge, in any sustained argument, by a number who enthusiastically support 
the development. The most significant of these occurred on the day the UK gave notice of its 
intention to leave, 29 March 2017. 
 The House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution has annual discussions, 
called “evidence sessions,” with the Cabinet Ministers of Government responsible for the 
legal system and with the senior judiciary, and in 2017 these included the sessions with the 
Lord Chief Justice and the President and Deputy President of the UKSC which have already 
been mentioned. At the session with the latter two held, I assume by coincidence, on 29 May 
2017, one of the members of the Committee, Lord Morgan, fulsomely congratulated the 
President and Deputy President on having, in Miller, “effectively” created a “constitutional 
court,” an arrangement which, Lord Morgan proposed, might be put on a “more formal” 
basis. Addressing the President, he asked: 
We had a series of very significant statements by the Supreme Court about the question 
of legal certainty in the case of Mrs. Miller, in which my colleague Lord Pannick was 
involved, which in a way was fortuitous. Mrs. Miller was a lone protester who won her 
point in the courts. It is fortunate that this was done, because we benefited from it 
hugely, and I hope the Government benefited from the wisdom of the Supreme Court. 
Would you think there was any merit in having a more formal arrangement on that? In 
effect, the Supreme Court, by pronouncing the eternal verities on the sovereignty of 
Parliament, acted as a constitutional court, as they have in France and other countries. 
Would you feel that a more formal structural relationship for that could be created?147 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
147 SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE CONSTITUTION, UNCORRECTED ORAL EVIDENCE WITH 
THE PRESIDENT AND DEPUTY PRESIDENT OF THE SUPREME COURT, supra note 92, Q3. 
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 Kenneth Morgan is a retired academic historian of distinction who has held important 
administrative posts in British higher education, including the Vice-chancellorship of the 
University of Aberystwyth. He was appointed to the Labour benches of the House of Lords 
by Mr. Blair in 2000, shortly after Mr. Blair’s Government had passed its reform of that 
House. Lord Morgan’s views may be regarded as representative of informed and influential 
left-liberal, lay opinion on constitutional matters. I fear, nevertheless, that his intendedly 
helpful question was something of a faux pas. The President’s reply, far from seizing the 
opportunity the question obviously offered, was most equivocal, eschewing anything concrete 
about what should be done in the UK and instead vaguely reviewing the various 
constitutional systems of the world.148 Nor did the Deputy President, or Lord Pannick, also a 
member, it will be recalled, of the Committee, take up this opportunity. 
 In this they were, in a sense, very wise. Putting what Miller has done on the more 
formal basis envisaged by the naïve Lord Morgan would involve public debate about the 
wisdom of establishing a constitutional court, and avoiding this inconvenience whilst 
establishing such a court is what Miller is all about. I understand that Marbury v Madison 
shared some of this quality akin to duplicity.149 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
148 In other public statements about Miller, Lord Neuberger has scrupulously sought to 
affirm Parliamentary sovereignty as he understands it. Lord Neuberger, Personal Support 
Unit Fundraising Breakfast, Reflections on Significant Moments in the Role of the Judiciary, 
March 16, 2017, https://www.supremecourt.uk/docs/speech-170316.pdf. 
149 ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT ch. 3 (6th ed. 2016). 
